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Note
DAVIS V. FEC: CLOSING THE ROAD TO WASHINGTON FOR
JOE THE PLUMBER
SAMEER VADERA
In Davis v. FEC,1 the Supreme Court of the United States considered
whether the financing regulatory scheme contained in Section 319(a) of the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (―BCRA‖)2 violated a selffinancing candidate‘s First Amendment rights.3 The Court held that the
asymmetrical contribution limits that Section 319(a) imposed on candidates
campaigning for the same seat in the United States House of
Representatives impermissibly burdened the self-financing candidate‘s
freedom of speech.4 In so holding, the Court incorrectly applied strict
scrutiny to Section 319(a)‘s contribution limits, instead of the ―closely
drawn‖ standard that prior case law established.5 By failing to apply the
―closely drawn‖ standard to the Act‘s contribution limits, the Court
increased barriers for non-wealthy candidates running for political seats by
(1) failing to protect fair and competitive elections and (2) jeopardizing
public funding as a viable method for clean elections.6 Had the Court
applied the ―closely drawn‖ scrutiny standard to Section 319(a), it would
have validated effective campaign finance reform that treats the concerns of
corruption in politics.7

Copyright © 2009 by Sameer Vadera.
Sameer Vadera is a second-year student at the University of Maryland School of Law
where he is a staff member for the Maryland Law Review. The author wishes to thank Professor
Gordon G. Young for providing great insight into the constitutional issues of campaign finance
regulations. The author owes special thanks to Kerry T. Cooperman and Heather R. Pruger for
their limitless goodwill, excellent editing, and invaluable intellectual support. Finally, the author
is forever grateful to his family and friends for their continued encouragement.
1. 128 S. Ct. 2759 (2008).
2. Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.).
3. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2770.
4. Id. at 2771.
5. See infra Part IV.A.
6. See infra Part IV.B.
7. See infra Part IV.C.
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I. THE CASE
Section 319 of the BCRA, known as the ―Millionaires‘ Amendment,‖8
regulates the expenditures of candidates running for election to the United
States House of Representatives (―House‖).9 Section 319(a) imposes
asymmetrical contribution limits on candidates when (1) one candidate
spends more than $350,000 of personal funds and (2) the opposing
candidate does not finance his own campaign.10 When Section 319(a) takes
effect, the self-financing candidate must adhere to typical campaign
contribution limits,11 but the non-self-financing candidate may receive three
times the typical contributions.12 Section 319(b) compels the selffinancing candidate to disclose more information than the non-selffinancing candidate.13
In March 2006, Democrat Jack Davis ran for New York‘s 26th
Congressional District seat in the House.14 To commence his candidacy,
Davis filed a ―Statement of Candidacy‖ with the Federal Election
Commission (―FEC‖).15 Unlike his opponent, Davis self-financed his
campaign and disclosed that he anticipated spending $1 million in personal
funds, which triggered Section 319(a)‘s asymmetrical regulatory scheme.16
Two months later, Davis sued the FEC, asking the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia to enjoin the FEC from enforcing

8. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2766.
9. BCRA § 319, 2 U.S.C. § 441a-1 (2006). The BCRA also includes a provision regulating
elections for the United States Senate that is similar, but not identical, to § 319(a). See 2 U.S.C.
§ 441a(i) (2006).
10. 2 U.S.C. § 441a-1(a); see also Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2766. A non-self-financing candidate
may begin receiving increased contribution amounts when his opponent‘s Opposition Personal
Funds Amount (―OPFA‖) surpasses $350,000. 2 U.S.C. § 441a-1(a)(1). To calculate the selffinancing candidate‘s OPFA, the non-self-financing candidate must add his opponent‘s
expenditures of personal funds to ―50% of the funds raised for the election at issue.‖ Id. § 441a1(a)(2)(A)-(B).
11. 2 U.S.C. § 441a-1(a)(1). The contribution limit for individual donors is currently set at
$2,300. Id. § 441a(a)(1)(A); 72 Fed. Reg. 5295 (Feb. 5, 2007). However, Congress adjusts the
contribution limits for inflation every two years. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(c). In addition, a candidate may
not accept funds from a donor who has contributed a total of $42,700 to other candidates and their
committees. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(3)(A); 72 Fed. Reg. 5295 (Feb. 5, 2007).
12. 2 U.S.C. § 441a-1(a)(1)(A). During the period of increased contribution limits, the nonself-financing candidate may receive up to $6,900 from each individual donor. See id.
13. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2766–67. Specifically, the self-financing candidate must (1) reveal
the amount of personal funds he or she intends to spend beyond the $350,000 threshold, (2) notify
the FEC when the OPFA has surpassed $350,000, and (3) notify the FEC regarding each
additional $10,000 expenditure of personal funds. Id. The non-self-financing candidate need only
notify the FEC of receipt of the self-financing candidate‘s notice indicating an OPFA greater than
$350,000. Id. at 2767.
14. Id. at 2767.
15. Id.
16. Id.
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Section 319 during the 2006 campaign on the grounds that Section 319
violated the First and Fifth Amendments.17 Both parties filed crossmotions for summary judgment.18
Granting summary judgment in favor of the FEC, the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia concluded that, although Davis
had standing to sue, his claims lacked merit.19 The court held that, because
Section 319(a) did not impose any burden on the self-financing candidate‘s
freedom to speak, it did not violate the First Amendment.20 In addition, the
court held that, because Section 319(a) merely equalized the candidates‘
financial strength, it did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.21 Davis
appealed directly to the Supreme Court of the United States under the
BCRA‘s exclusive appellate review provision.22
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Because ―virtually every‖ form of political speech requires the
expenditure of money, the Supreme Court has consistently held that any
regulation on campaign financing implicates freedom of speech concerns.23
The Court mainly applies the First Amendment to two aspects of campaign
finance regulations: (1) contributions and (2) expenditures.24 First, the
Court invalidates campaign contribution limits unless they are ―closely
drawn‖ to serve a sufficiently important governmental interest.25 Second,
the Court strikes down limits on campaign expenditures unless they are
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.26 Recently,
however, a number of state and federal courts have broken away from
traditional campaign finance notions and have held that expenditure limits
are not per se unconstitutional.27

17. Id. Davis argued that § 319(a) burdened his First Amendment right to fund his own
speech because it let his opponent raise more money to finance contradictory speech. Id. at 2770.
18. Id. at 2768.
19. See Davis v. FEC, 501 F. Supp. 2d 22, 27, 32, 34 (D.D.C. 2007) (acknowledging that
Davis suffered the requisite injury to satisfy standing requirements, but holding that § 319(a) did
not violate the First or Fifth Amendments).
20. Id. at 31.
21. Id. at 33–34.
22. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2768. The BCRA mandates that a final decision shall be reviewable
only by appeal directly to the Supreme Court of the United States. Bipartisan Campaign Reform
Act of 2002, § 403(a)(3), 2 U.S.C. § 437h note (2006). The Court must ―advance on the docket
and . . . expedite to the greatest possible extent the disposition of the . . . appeal.‖ Id. § 403(a)(4),
2 U.S.C. § 437h note.
23. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) (per curiam); see also infra Part II.A.
24. See infra Part II.B.
25. See infra Part II.B.1.
26. See infra Part II.B.2.
27. See infra Part II.C.
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A. The Supreme Court Views Campaign Spending as Protected
Speech Under the First Amendment Because “Virtually Every”
Means of Political Speech Requires the Expenditure of Money
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that
―Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.‖28 Its
purpose is to preserve an ―uninhibited marketplace of ideas‖ where the truth
ultimately prevails.29 In addition, the Constitution grants Congress the
power to ―make or alter‖ rules governing federal elections.30 In applying
the First Amendment to campaign finance legislation, the Supreme Court
has consistently held that, because money enables political speech,
restrictions on campaign funding restrain free speech.31
The Supreme Court first determined that campaign finance limits
regulated speech, not conduct, in Buckley v. Valeo,32 where several
politicians claimed that certain provisions of the amended Federal Elections
Campaign Act (―FECA‖)33 violated their First Amendment rights.34 In
applying the First Amendment to the FECA, the Court observed that limits
on funding seriously impaired the quality, depth, and range of political
expression.35 Thus, the Court rejected the notion that restrictions on
spending targeted conduct, not speech.36 The Court further explained that
the dependence of communication on expenditures of money does not
reduce the level of scrutiny that the First Amendment requires.37 Since
Buckley, the Court has strictly adhered to this belief.38

28. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
29. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
30. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.
31. See infra notes 32–38 and accompanying text.
32. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
33. Federal Elections Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263
(codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431–442).
34. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 6–9.
35. Id. at 19.
36. Id. at 16 (―We cannot share the view that the [FECA‘s] contribution and expenditure
limitations are comparable to the restrictions on conduct upheld in O’Brien.‖).
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 242 (2006) (noting that during the previous
thirty years, the Supreme Court has repeatedly adhered to Buckley‘s constraints on expenditure
limits); Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 657 (1990) (applying the Buckley
framework to determine the constitutionality of Michigan‘s campaign finance laws).
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B. Statutes Imposing Direct Contribution and Expenditure Limits for
Campaign Spending Implicate First Amendment Concerns Because
Both Reduce Political Expression
In attempting to reform campaign finance regulatory schemes,
Congress has consistently targeted ―big money‖ because of the belief that
large contributions and expenditures corrupt the electoral process.39 To
address this problem, Congress has established a limits-based approach.40
The Court scrutinizes Congress‘s limits in two ways. First, the Court
invalidates contribution limits unless they are closely drawn to serve a
substantially important governmental interest.41 Second, the Court strikes
down expenditure limits unless Congress has narrowly tailored them to
serve a compelling governmental interest.42
1. Because Contribution Limits Reduce Corruption and the
Appearance of Corruption, the Supreme Court Sustains These
Limits Unless They Are so Low as to Prevent Effective
Campaigning
The first enactment aimed at reducing the harmful influence of ―big
money‖ campaign contributions followed President Theodore Roosevelt‘s
call for legislation forbidding all contributions by corporations.43 In
response, Congress enacted the Tillman Act of 1907,44 which completely
banned corporate contributions in connection with any federal election.45
As corporations used loopholes to bypass regulations, Congress responded
by enacting the Federal Corrupt Practices Act,46 which broadened
―contributions‖ to include ―anything of value.‖47 The Act withstood an
attack in Burroughs v. United States,48 where directors of a political action
committee violated the Act‘s disclosure requirements by accepting
contributions without filing reports.49
The defendants challenged

39. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 115 (2003) (stating that Congress ―has repeatedly
enacted legislation‖ that prevents ―great aggregations of wealth‖).
40. See id. at 115–22 (discussing the history of the limits-based approach to address campaign
finance issues).
41. See infra Part II.B.1.
42. See infra Part II.B.2.
43. United States v. UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. 567, 571–72 (1957).
44. Pub. L. No. 59-36, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864.
45. Id. 34 Stat. at 864–65.
46. Pub. L. No. 68-506, §§ 301, 313, 43 Stat. 1070, 1074 (1925) (codified as amended at 2
U.S.C. §§ 241–248).
47. Id. § 302(d). The Act criminalized both the giving and receiving of corporate
contributions. Id. § 313.
48. 290 U.S. 534 (1934).
49. Id. at 543.
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Congress‘s authority to require disclosure of political contributions, arguing
that the Constitution limited Congress‘s role to choosing the date and time
of elections.50 In upholding the Act, the Court rejected the defendants‘
argument and concluded that Congress had the inherent power to protect the
elections, ―‗on which its existence depends,‘‖51 from corruption.52
Shortly after World War II, Congress extended its prohibition to
campaign contributions made by unions.53 Following the expansive trend
of campaign regulations, Congress also expanded its restrictions to cover
both primary and general elections.54 Consistently, Congress justified its
increasingly prohibitive campaign finance reform by emphasizing the
growing concern of the parasitic effects of large campaign contributions on
the electoral system.55
In 1974, Congress further strengthened federal election laws by
enacting the FECA.56 The Act limited (1) contributions that a candidate
could receive, (2) expenditures of personal funds a candidate could make,
and (3) expenditures an individual or organization could make in support of
a candidate.57 In 1976, the Supreme Court in Buckley addressed whether
the First Amendment invalidated the FECA‘s campaign finance
restrictions.58 In a per curiam decision, the Supreme Court upheld the
FECA‘s contribution restrictions.59 Distinguishing contributions from
expenditures, the Court found that, although both ―implicate fundamental
First Amendment interests,‖ direct limits on expenditures cause more
severe restrictions on the protected freedom of political expression.60 In
contrast, the Court observed that contribution limits allow individuals to
50. Id. at 544. The defendants argued that Article II, Section 1 only granted Congress the
authority to determine ―‗the time of choosing the electors, and the day on which they shall give
their votes.‘‖ Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1).
51. Id. at 546 (quoting Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 658 (1884)).
52. See id. at 547 (―The power of Congress to protect the election of President and Vice
President from corruption being clear, the choice of means to that end presents a question
primarily addressed to the judgment of Congress.‖).
53. See War Labor Disputes Act of 1943, Pub. L. No. 78-89, ch. 144, § 9, 57 Stat. 167.
Congress regulated unions because they made ―enormous financial outlays‖ in connection with
national elections. United States v. UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. 567, 579 (1957).
54. See Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, ch. 120, §§ 304, 313,
61 Stat. 136, 159 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141–187).
55. See 93 CONG. REC. 3428, 3522 (1947); H.R. REP. NO. 245 (1947); S. REP. NO. 1 (1947).
56. See also McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 117–18 (2003) (documenting Congress‘s
―steady‖ improvement of election law over the years).
57. FECA § 101. See also Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431–442).
58. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1976) (per curiam).
59. Id. at 35 (―[W]e conclude that the impact of the [FECA‘s] . . . contribution limitation on
major-party challengers and on minor-party candidates does not render the provision
unconstitutional on its face.‖).
60. Id. at 23.
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associate with a political party, and that limiting the amount of the
contribution places a permissible burden on the First Amendment rights of
voters.61 Additionally, the Court determined that the government‘s interest
in limiting corruption and the appearance of corruption resulting from large
financial contributions was ―a constitutionally sufficient‖ justification for
contribution limits, but not for expenditure limits.62
In 2000, the Court in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC63
reemphasized the constitutional validity of contribution limits by holding
that Buckley was ―authority for comparable state regulations.‖64 In Nixon, a
candidate for public office challenged a Missouri campaign finance law that
limited contributions to $1,075.65 Upholding the contribution limits after
applying ―closely drawn‖ scrutiny, the Court revisited Buckley‘s analysis
and concluded that ―[t]here [was] no reason in logic . . . to doubt‖
Buckley.66 The Court highlighted Buckley‘s reasoning that, although
contribution limits marginally impaired political communication, Congress
had a valid interest in reducing corruption by limiting political donations.67
Lastly, the Court explained that Buckley did not specify a constitutional
minimum contribution limit, but that Congress may legislate these limits so
long as they do not ―render political association ineffective.‖68
In 2002, Congress enacted the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act
(―BCRA‖)69 to close the FECA‘s loopholes and to address the state of
political campaigning since Buckley.70 The BCRA imposed asymmetrical
contribution limits on candidates when a self-financing candidate surpassed
$350,000 in expenditures.71 In 2003, a group of public officials and other
various organizations challenged portions of the BCRA in McConnell v.
FEC.72 The Court reaffirmed that it must pay special deference to
Congress when scrutinizing contribution limits because such limits do not
implicate severe First Amendment concerns.73 The Court explained further
that the less rigorous ―closely drawn‖ standard is the appropriate standard to

61. Id. at 20–22.
62. Id. at 26.
63. 528 U.S. 377 (2000).
64. Id. at 382.
65. Id. at 382–83. The plaintiff claimed that, with inflation since Buckley, the limit of $1,075
was too low. Id. at 383–84.
66. Id. at 386–88, 397.
67. Id. at 387–88.
68. Id. at 397.
69. Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.)
70. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 132–33 (2003).
71. BCRA § 319, 2 U.S.C. § 441a-1(a) (2006).
72. 540 U.S. 93; see also McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 220–27 (2003).
73. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 137.
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allow Congress to effectively improve campaign finance regulations.74
Justice Kennedy dissented in part, commenting that the majority‘s decision
―expand[ed] Congress‘ regulatory power,‖ even though Buckley did not
grant Congress the power to ―shape[] and form[]‖ campaign finance
regulations.75
Most recently, in Randall v. Sorrell,76 the Court expressed the need for
restrictions on Congress‘s ability to impose contribution limits in
elections.77
In Randall, several politicians challenged Vermont‘s
contribution limits as unconstitutionally low.78 The Randall plurality79
explained that if limits are too low, they may ―harm the electoral process by
preventing challengers from mounting effective campaigns against
incumbent officeholders.‖80 Thus, the plurality acknowledged that,
although the Court ―ordinarily . . . defer[s] to the legislature‘s
determination,‖ it does not do so when limits are so low as to be
counterproductive.81
2. Limits on Campaign Expenditures Involve More Serious First
Amendment Concerns Than Limits on Campaign Contributions
Because Expenditure Limits Infringe on a Candidate’s
Constitutional Right to Promote His or Her Platform
The FECA was the first campaign finance legislation to directly limit a
candidate‘s expenditures.82 The Buckley Court observed that the FECA‘s
expenditure limits substantially reduced the amount of political speech in
campaigns.83 Specifically, the Court noted that, although the restrictions on

74. Id. For example, before enactment of the BCRA, federal law permitted corporations and
unions to make unlimited contributions directly to a political party, instead of to a specific
candidate, thus circumventing FECA regulations and disclosure requirements. Id. at 122–23.
However, Title I of the BCRA attempted to improve campaign finance by ―plug[ging] the softmoney loophole.‖ Id. at 133.
75. Id. at 286–87 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
76. 548 U.S. 230 (2006).
77. Id. at 248–49 (―Nonetheless, as Buckley acknowledged, we must recognize the existence
of some lower bound.‖).
78. Id. at 239–40. Vermont‘s campaign contribution statute limited contributions from
individuals to $200 per election per candidate. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2805(a) (2002).
79. Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Breyer, and Justice Alito were members of the Randall
plurality. Randall, 548 U.S. at 236.
80. Id. at 248–49.
81. Id.
82. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 118–19 (2003).
83. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 39 (1976) (per curiam) (―It is clear that a primary effect of
these expenditure limitations is to restrict the quantity of campaign speech by individuals, groups,
and candidates.‖).
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expenditures are neutral as to content,84 they ―limit political expression ‗at
the core of our electoral process and of the First Amendment freedoms.‘‖85
The Court reasoned that the government‘s interests in limiting personal
expenditures did not justify infringing on candidates‘ ―unfettered‖ right to
voice their platforms to the electorate.86 First, the Court determined that the
primary governmental interest in preventing corruption and the appearance
of corruption did not support limitations on a candidate‘s expenditures of
personal funds.87 Specifically, a candidate using personal funds can rely
less on outside contributions, thereby counteracting ―coercive pressures‖
and eliminating the need for expenditure limits.88
Second, the
government‘s interest in equalizing candidates‘ financial resources did not
sufficiently justify the FECA‘s severe infringement on candidates‘
protected right to advance their own political platforms.89
Justice White wrote a separate opinion in which he dissented from the
judgment invalidating the expenditure limits and concurred in the judgment
upholding contribution limits.90 Justice White explained that, because the
FECA‘s expenditure limits were content-neutral, the Court should have
upheld the FECA‘s expenditure limits ―so long as the purposes they
serve[d] [were] legitimate and sufficiently substantial.‖91 Justice White
noted that the Court should defer to congressional judgment because
Congress legitimately sought to reduce corruption by imposing expenditure
limits.92
84. Prior case law indicates that content-based restrictions are subject to strict scrutiny
because the First Amendment bars the government from restricting speech based on its message,
idea, or subject matter. See, e.g., Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 774, 788
(2002) (invalidating a judicial election statute because it prohibited speech based on its content);
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 123 (1991)
(invalidating a statute because it significantly burdened speech of a particular content); Police
Dept. of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 94 (1972) (invalidating a disorderly conduct ordinance
because it permitted picketing based on its subject matter). But see Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S.
191, 211 (1992) (upholding content-based regulations because the exercise of free speech within
100 feet of a polling station conflicts with the fundamental right of voting free from intimidation
and fraud). In contrast, the Court applies the less rigorous intermediate scrutiny to content-neutral
regulations. See, e.g., United States v. O‘Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (holding that contentneutral regulations are constitutional when they are ―no greater than is essential‖ to furthering an
important or substantial governmental interest).
85. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 39 (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968)).
86. Id. at 52–53.
87. Id. at 53.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 54.
90. Id. at 257 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
91. See id. at 259–60, 263–64.
92. Id. at 261 (―Congress was . . . of the view that these expenditures . . . have corruptive
potential; but the Court strikes down the provision . . . claiming more insight as to what may
improperly influence candidates than is possessed by the majority of Congress that passed this bill
and the President who signed it.‖).
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In 1986, in FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc.,93 the FEC
sued a nonprofit corporation for making political expenditures from its
general treasury fund.94
The Court held that, although for-profit
corporations must make independent campaign expenditures from
segregated funds, nonprofit political associations may make campaign
expenditures directly from their treasury funds.95 Justice Brennan, writing
for the majority, reasoned that individuals who contribute to political
associations are aware of their political purposes, and thus the political
associations should not have to spend from segregated political funds.96
Four years later, in Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce,97
a corporation challenged a Michigan law that allowed corporations to make
independent expenditures for a campaign from their segregated funds, but
not from their general treasury funds.98 Applying strict scrutiny, the Court
upheld the statute, finding that the Michigan legislature designed the
restriction to assure that funds accumulated and used for campaign
expenditures correlated to public support of the corporation‘s political
ideas.99
In 1996, in Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v.
FEC (―Colorado I‖),100 the Colorado Republican Party challenged a FECA
provision limiting political party expenditures.101 Protecting political party
spending, the Court struck down the provision and held that the First
Amendment prohibits limits on party expenditures made independently,
―without coordinating with a candidate.‖102 The Court reasoned that a
political party, like a candidate, has a protected First Amendment right to
independently express its political views.103
The Court, however, resolved an issue left open by Colorado I in FEC
v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee (―Colorado II‖),104
93. 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
94. Id. at 241.
95. Id. at 241, 263–64.
96. Id. at 260–61. The Court noted that the treasury funds of nonprofit political associations
―reflect popular support for the [organization‘s] political positions.‖ Id. at 258.
97. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
98. Id. at 654–55. The segregated funds were required to be designated for political purposes
only. Id. Under Michigan law, only certain individuals could donate funds to a corporation‘s
segregated political fund. Id. at 656 (citing Michigan Campaign Finance Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS
§§ 169.255(2), (3) (1979)).
99. Id. at 660.
100. 518 U.S. 604 (1996).
101. Id. at 608. The FECA provision imposed dollar limits on political party ―expenditures in
connection with a general election campaign for [a] congressional [candidate].‖ Id. (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 615–16.
104. 533 U.S. 431 (2001).
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finding that coordinated party expenditures are similar to contributions, and
thus the ―closely drawn‖ standard should apply to those spending limits.105
The Colorado II Court held that unlimited coordinated party expenditures
would increase corruption by enabling parties to circumvent the
contribution limits that the FECA imposed and therefore upheld the
expenditure limits.106
In 2006, the Supreme Court rejected the opportunity to overturn
Buckley when reexamining whether a limit on candidates‘ expenditures
violated the First Amendment.107 In Randall v. Sorrell, the Vermont
Republican State Committee challenged Vermont‘s mandatory spending
limits as a violation of free speech.108 The Court held that the Vermont
election law violated the Buckley standard, and thus the First
Amendment.109 The Court declined this opportunity to overturn Buckley by
determining that, because contribution limits adequately reduced
corruption, there was no need to limit expenditures.110 Recognizing that
Vermont‘s justification for its expenditure limits mimicked those set forth
in Buckley, the Court also refused to limit Buckley‘s holding with respect to
spending restrictions.111
C. Recently, a Number of State and Federal Courts Have Broken Away
from Buckley’s Traditional View that No Governmental Interest
Justifies Limits on a Candidate’s Expenditures of Personal Funds
Because many courts have criticized Buckley,112 a number of lower
federal and state courts have held that Buckley‘s holding does not foreclose
limitations on a candidate‘s expenditures.113 For instance, in Kruse v. City
of Cincinnati,114 a candidate for City Council challenged the city‘s
campaign finance regulations that imposed expenditure limitations on
candidates.115 Although the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
105. Id. at 456.
106. Id. at 455, 465.
107. Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 243 (2006).
108. Id. at 240. Vermont‘s law imposed mandatory expenditure limits on the total amount a
candidate for state office could spend during an election cycle. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2805a(a)
(2002). The law imposed expenditure limits in the following amounts: governor, $300,000;
lieutenant governor, $100,000; state senator, $4,000; state representative (two member district),
$3,000; and state representative (single member district), $2,000. Id.
109. Randall, 548 U.S. at 246.
110. Id. at 244.
111. Id. at 244–46.
112. As of May 18, 2009, 100 court opinions viewed Buckley negatively on Westlaw‘s Citing
References.
113. See infra notes 114–123.
114. 142 F.3d 907 (6th Cir. 1998).
115. Id. at 910.
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Circuit invalidated the spending limits, the court observed that Buckley left
open the question of whether any governmental interest would justify
expenditure limits.116 Judge Cohn concurred separately, writing that
Buckley did not declare all expenditure limits to be unconstitutional.117
Rather, he suggested, a factual record may be developed that establishes a
valid need for spending limits.118
A few years later, in Homans v. City of Albuquerque,119 the United
States District Court for the District of New Mexico heard a challenge to
Albuquerque‘s mandatory expenditure limits from a candidate for
mayor.120 Judge Vazquez, relying on Judge Cohn‘s concurring opinion in
Kruse, determined that Buckley‘s holding was not a per se prohibition on
spending limits because the Buckley Court only considered a limited set of
interests.121
Judge Vazquez held that the city had developed a
comprehensive factual record indicating the need for a limit on campaign
spending and that these limits effectively reduced corruption and
significantly increased voter turnout.122 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit
affirmed the district court‘s determination that Buckley‘s holding did not
foreclose expenditure limits per se.123
III. THE COURT‘S REASONING
In Davis v. FEC,124 the United States Supreme Court reversed the
judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia by
holding that Sections 319(a) and (b) of the BCRA violated the First
Amendment.125 Writing for a five-to-four majority, Justice Alito began by
describing Section 319‘s asymmetrical regulatory scheme.126 First, the
Court noted that, when triggered, Section 319(a) allows a non-self116. Id. at 918–19.
117. Id. at 920 (Cohn, J., concurring) (―The Supreme Court‘s decision in Buckley, however, is
not a broad pronouncement declaring all campaign expenditure limits unconstitutional.‖).
118. Id. (―It may be possible to develop a factual record to establish that the interest in freeing
officeholders from the pressures of fundraising so they can perform their duties, or the interest in
preserving faith in our democracy, is compelling . . . .‖).
119. 160 F. Supp. 2d 1266 (D.N.M. 2001), aff’d, 366 F.3d 900 (10th Cir. 2004).
120. Id. at 1267.
121. Id. at 1271–72 (citing Kruse v. City of Cincinnati, 142 F.3d 907 (6th Cir. 1998)). The
Buckley Court only considered three governmental interests: corruption, the appearance of
corruption, and equalizing the playing field. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 53–54 (1976) (per
curiam).
122. Homans, 160 F. Supp. 2d at 1272.
123. Homans v. City of Albuquerque, 366 F.3d 900, 906 (10th Cir. 2004) (―The [Buckley]
Court's chosen language leaves open the possibility that at least in some circumstances
expenditure limits may withstand constitutional scrutiny.‖).
124. 128 S. Ct. 2759 (2008).
125. Id. at 2775.
126. Id. at 2766–67.
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financing candidate to receive contributions from individuals at three times
the normal limit.127 Second, the Court explained that Section 319(b)
requires the self-financing candidate to make additional disclosures during
the period Section 319(a) is active.128
After determining that the Court had jurisdiction to hear Davis‘s
appeal,129 the Court examined the merits of Davis‘s claim that Section
319(a) violated the First Amendment.130 First, the Davis Court noted that if
Section 319(a) had increased the contribution limits for all candidates,
Davis‘s claim would have failed because there is no constitutional basis for
arguing that such limits were too high.131 Second, the Court emphasized
that Buckley established that a cap on personal expenditures directly
restrained a candidate‘s First Amendment right to discuss public issues and
advocate for his own election.132 Thus, Justice Alito explained, although
the BCRA did not cap personal funds, it penalized a candidate for
personally funding his First Amendment right.133 Further, Justice Alito
noted that the Court had ―never upheld [a campaign finance statute] that
impose[d] different contribution limits for candidates . . . competing against
each other.‖134 Justice Alito concluded that, because no compelling state or
government interest justified the substantial burden imposed on the selffinancing candidate, Section 319(a) was unconstitutional.135
Finally, the Davis Court explained that Section 319(b) also violated
the First Amendment because the provision imposed unjustified compelled

127. Id. at 2766. The normal limit is $2,300 and the enhanced limit under the BCRA is $6,900.
Id.
128. Id. at 2766–67.
129. In discussing standing, Justice Alito noted that Davis‘s undisputed standing to challenge
§ 319(b) did not necessarily establish his standing to challenge § 319(a). Id. at 2768–69. Davis
could challenge § 319(b) because he faced the imminent threat of submitting additional
notifications after he passed the $350,000 threshold. Id. at 2768. In addition, invalidating
§ 319(b) would have been an appropriate remedy for Davis. Id. The FEC argued that Davis
lacked standing to challenge § 319(a) because Davis‘s opponent did not use the asymmetrical
limits. Id. at 2769. However, the Court concluded that, even though the harm was not actualized,
Davis‘s threatened injury was real, immediate, and direct, thus establishing his standing to contest
§ 319(a). Id. Justice Alito then explained that Davis‘s claims were not moot because the case
―‗fit comfortably within the established exception to mootness for disputes capable of repetition,
yet evading review.‘‖ Id. (quoting FEC v. Wisc. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2662
(2007)). The ―exception applies where (1) the challenged action is in its duration too short to be
fully litigated prior to cessation or expiration; and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the
same complaining party will be subject to the same action again.‖ Id. (quoting Wisc. Right to Life,
127 S. Ct. at 2662) (internal quotation marks omitted).
130. Id. at 2770.
131. Id. at 2770–71.
132. Id. at 2771 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 52 (1976) (per curiam)).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 2772–74.
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disclosure.136 Justice Alito applied heightened scrutiny to Section 319(b)
because compelled disclosure seriously infringed on the privacy of
association guaranteed by the First Amendment.137 Justice Alito concluded
that, in light of the Court‘s holding that Section 319(a) was
unconstitutional, Section 319(b)‘s disclosure requirements could not be
justified because they implemented the contribution limits.138
Justice Stevens dissented separately, agreeing that Davis‘s case was
justiciable, but disagreeing that the BCRA‘s contribution limits imposed a
substantial burden on the self-financing candidate‘s freedom of speech.139
Justice Stevens first stressed that Congress enacted Section 319(a) to reduce
the self-financing candidate‘s advantage by relaxing the contribution limits
the non-self-financing candidate would normally face.140 Further, Justice
Stevens explained that the BCRA‘s reasonable limits are justified because
they free candidates from the burden of endless fundraising and have the
effect of improving the overall quality of the speech.141 Next, Justice
Stevens explained that Section 319(a) did not restrain speech, but rather it
enabled a non-self-financing candidate to obtain enough money to make his
voice heard.142 Last, in addressing Davis‘s equal protection argument,
Justice Stevens explained that because ―‗Congress is fully entitled to
consider . . . real-world differences‘‖ in campaign finance laws, the
Constitution does not require identical treatment of all candidates.143
Justice Ginsburg wrote a short dissenting opinion, agreeing that Davis
had standing to sue but ultimately agreeing with the lower court‘s
decision.144 Justice Ginsburg explained that she did not join the part of
Justice Stevens‘s opinion that addressed Buckley‘s holding that expenditure
limits restricted political communications.145 Justice Ginsburg noted that
the FEC did not ask the Davis Court to overrule Buckley, and thus a
reconsideration of Buckley was inappropriate.146

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id. at 2774–75.
Id.
Id. at 2775.
Id. at 2777, 2780 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 2779.
Id. at 2780.
Id. at 2782 (alteration in original) (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 188 (2003)).
Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 2782–83.
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IV. ANALYSIS
In Davis v. FEC,147 the United States Supreme Court invalidated
Section 319(a) of the BCRA, holding that it impermissibly burdened free
speech because its limits chilled the self-financing candidate‘s right to make
unlimited expenditures by benefitting his or her opponent.148 In so holding,
the Court improperly raised the scrutiny standard applied to campaign
contribution limits from ―closely drawn‖ scrutiny to strict scrutiny.149 The
Court‘s decision effectively blocks non-wealthy candidates from competing
against wealthy candidates seeking congressional seats by (1) exacerbating
unfair competition and (2) bringing public funding into constitutional
uncertainty.150 Had the Court applied ―closely drawn‖ scrutiny to uphold
the BCRA‘s contribution limits, non-wealthy candidates would have the
opportunity for fair campaigns, public funding would be constitutionally
secure, and voter confidence in politics would increase.151
A. The Supreme Court Improperly Increased Scrutiny of Campaign
Contribution Limits by Applying Strict Scrutiny, Which the Court
Has Exclusively Reserved for Direct Expenditure Limits
The Davis Court incorrectly applied strict scrutiny to the BCRA‘s
contribution limits, which had an unclear effect on Davis‘s political
speech,152 instead of the historically applicable ―closely drawn‖ standard of
scrutiny.153 Justice Alito suggested that, because Section 319(a)‘s
contribution limits impose a substantial burden on a candidate‘s freedom of
speech, the limits were only valid if Congress could justify them with a
compelling governmental interest.154 But, because contribution limits
―entail[] only a marginal restriction upon the contributor‘s ability to engage

147. 128 S. Ct. 2759.
148. Id. at 2774 (majority opinion).
149. See infra Part IV.A. The Court has traditionally applied the latter standard only in cases
involving direct expenditure limits. See supra Part II.B.2
150. See infra Part IV.B.
151. See infra Part IV.C.
152. During oral arguments, Justice Souter expressed reservations as to the chilling effect of
§ 319(a): ―[D]on‘t we expect a chill argument to at least have a ring of plausibility? . . . It didn‘t
deter your client. There is no indication that it would deter anybody else and I have to say I don‘t
see why it would.‖ Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, Davis, 128 S. Ct. 2759 (No. 07-320).
153. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2772. Some commentators argue that campaign finance laws do not
create First Amendment concerns, and therefore that these laws do not warrant application of strict
scrutiny. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer & Richard H. Pildes, Electoral Exceptionalism and the First
Amendment, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1803, 1821 (1999) (arguing that other areas of the law, including
contracts, warranties, deeds, fraud, and securities, are seen as regulating speech without any First
Amendment scrutiny).
154. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2772.
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in free communication,‖155 the Court has historically applied a ―closely
drawn‖ scrutiny test.156 Indeed, in Nixon, where candidates challenged
Missouri‘s contribution limits, the Court reversed the Eighth Circuit, which
strictly scrutinized the limits, and instead applied ―closely drawn‖
scrutiny.157 In doing so, the Nixon Court declared that ―‗restrictions on
contributions require less compelling justification than restrictions‘‖ on
expenditures.158
Thus, because Section 319(a) imposed limits on
contributions, not expenditures, the Davis Court incorrectly applied strict
scrutiny.
Under the ―closely drawn‖ scrutiny standard, the Davis Court should
have upheld Section 319(a). First, because the BCRA enables a non-selffinancing candidate to freely initiate debate and to respond to his
opponent‘s speech without restriction, the BCRA‘s contribution limits do
not impair political communication.159 Instead, as Justice Stevens noted in
dissent, Section 319(a) does not quiet speech, but rather assists the nonwealthy candidate spread his message.160 The BCRA‘s limits are
distinguishable from the expenditure limits in Buckley because they do not
impose a direct restraint on a candidate‘s communication.161 In fact, the
self-financing candidate‘s ability to make unlimited expenditures counters
the argument that Section 319(a) imposes a substantial burden on his
political expression.162

155. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1976).
156. See, e.g., Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 253 (2006) (applying ―closely drawn‖ scrutiny
to contribution limits because they do not significantly impair political communication);
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 136 (2003) (same); FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 161–62
(2003) (same); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov‘t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 387–88 (2000) (same).
157. Nixon, 528 U.S. at 384–85, 387–88.
158. Id. at 387 (quoting FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 259–60 (1986)).
See also Deborah Goldberg & Brenda Wright, Defending Campaign Contribution Limits After
Randall v. Sorrell, 63 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 661, 671–72 (2008) (commenting on the Nixon
Court‘s rejection of arguments in favor of applying strict scrutiny to contribution limits).
159. See Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2780 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that § 319(a) does not
impose any burden on the self-financing candidate because he has the option to make unlimited
expenditures from his personal funds); Davis v. FEC, 501 F. Supp. 2d 22, 29 (D.D.C. 2007)
(same).
160. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2780 (―On the contrary, it does no more than assist the opponent of a
self-funding candidate in his attempts to make his voice heard . . . .‖). Justice Stevens also noted
that the self-financing candidate may structure his campaign as he pleases—either funding it
himself without limits, or relying on contributions alone. Id. at 2780 n.6.
161. Compare Davis, 501 F. Supp. 2d at 29 (stating that the ―Millionaires‘ Amendment does
not limit in any way the use of a candidate‘s personal wealth‖ for political elections), with
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 39 (holding that FECA‘s expenditure limits impose ―direct and substantial
restraints on the quantity of political speech‖).
162. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2780 (―The self-financing candidate‘s ability to engage meaningfully
in the political process is in no way undermined by [§ 319(a)].‖).
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Second, because the Court consistently defers to Congress when
scrutinizing contribution limits,163 the Davis majority should have accepted
Congress‘s good-faith attempt to ―regulate, within the bounds of the
Constitution,‖ campaign finance.164 As Justice Stevens pointed out,
Congress ―carefully tailored‖ Section 319(a) to address the unequal
financial strength of candidates by creating the Opposition Personal Funds
Amount formula, which prevents non-self-financing candidates from
reaping windfalls.165 Moreover, as the Court has conceded in earlier cases,
legislators are better equipped to make judgments on campaign finance
reform because they have expertise in ―matters related to the costs and
nature of running for office.‖166 Thus, heightening the level of scrutiny
applied to the BCRA‘s contribution limits was improper and created
substantial roadblocks for non-wealthy candidates attempting to run for
public office.167
B. Davis Creates Substantial Barriers for Non-Wealthy Candidates
Who Compete Against Wealthy Candidates for Seats in the House
Because Competition Is Unfair and the Availability of Public
Funding Is Declining
The Davis Court‘s improper application of strict scrutiny to
contribution limits disincentivizes non-wealthy candidates from running for
public office for two reasons: (1) unfair campaign competition168 and (2)
lack of public funding.169
Davis‘s invalidation of the BCRA‘s contribution limits reduces fair
competition in House races in two ways. First, in striking down the
BCRA‘s asymmetrical contribution limits for impermissibly chilling the
self-financing candidate‘s speech, the Davis Court failed to address the
advantage that wealthy candidates naturally have in House elections.170

163. See, e.g., Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 248 (2006) (stating that the Court ordinarily
defers to the legislature in assessing the validity of campaign finance regulations because
Congress is better equipped in matters related to running for office).
164. See Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2779.
165. Id. at 2780, 2782 (―[T]he self-funder‘s opponent may avail himself of the enhanced
contribution limits only until parity is achieved, at which point he becomes again ineligible for
contributions above the normal maximum.‖); see also supra note 10. The two rationales of the
Millionaires‘ Amendment are ―reducing the importance of wealth as a criterion for public office
and countering the perception that seats in the United States Congress are available for purchase
by the wealthiest bidder.‖ Id. at 2779–80.
166. Randall, 548 U.S. at 248.
167. See infra Part IV.B.
168. See infra notes 170–176 and accompanying text.
169. See infra notes 176–191 and accompanying text.
170. During the 2004 congressional elections, in 95% of House races and 91% of Senate races,
the candidate who spent the most money won the seat. 2004 Election Outcome: Money Wins,
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Absent the BCRA‘s protections, a non-wealthy candidate begins the
campaign at a disadvantage because he lacks the benefit of immediately
available funding, which a self-financing candidate enjoys.171 Thus, the
Davis Court‘s determination that each election is a zero-sum game172 is
only accurate when both candidates have equal funding. 173 Otherwise, a
non-wealthy candidate must spend more time fundraising, which prevents
him from debating issues and promoting his platform. 174 In contrast,
because a wealthy candidate personally funds his campaign, he may
communicate with the electorate without the additional time burden of
fundraising.175 Furthermore, the BCRA‘s asymmetrical contribution limits
cease once a non-wealthy candidate‘s funds match a wealthy candidate‘s
funds.176 Thus, invalidating the BCRA‘s contribution limits reduces the
fairness and competitiveness of campaigns by returning wealthy candidates‘
natural advantage.
Second, the Davis Court neglected to recognize that political equality
is a ―time-honored‖ principle and was a major concern for the Framers of
the Constitution.177 Davis‘s invalidation of Section 319(a)‘s asymmetrical
contribution limits jeopardizes viable public financing schemes by
delegitimizing the need to level the playing field in the electoral process.
Under the current campaign finance regime, non-wealthy members of the
public campaigning for seats in the House may elect to receive public

http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2004/11/2004-election-outcome-money-wi.html (last visited
May 18, 2009).
171. See Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2774 (2008) (acknowledging that wealthy candidates
have an advantage while campaigning).
172. See id. at 2771–72 (inferring that BCRA‘s enhanced contribution limits are a penalty to
the self-financing candidate who ―robustly exercises [his] First Amendment right‖).
173. See Brief of Appellee at 31, Davis, 128 S. Ct. 2759 (No. 07-320) (―More fundamentally,
however, appellant cannot have it both ways. If he claims constitutional injury from his
opponent‘s increased funding options, he cannot turn around and deny that he derives a benefit
from keeping the baseline limits in place.‖).
174. See Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2779 (stating that § 319(a)‘s increased contribution limits would
reduce the non-self-financing candidate‘s burden of fundraising).
175. See Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 245–46 (2006) (discussing the ―increased
fundraising demands‖ of the non-wealthy candidate). While the Randall plurality rejected a
government interest in protecting a candidates time, one commentator suggests that the court is
not foreclosed from recognizing such a governmental interest because Randall was decided on
stare decisis grounds rather than on the merits. Jessica Furst, Money and Politics: Will
Expenditure Limits Take Candidates Out of the Money Race and Put Them Back in the Office?, 59
FLA. L. REV. 873, 903 (2007). Furst suggests that the Randall plurality‘s rejection of the
government‘s interest in protection of candidates‘ time presents an opportunity for challenge in
the future because the plurality did not support its judgment with precedent. Id. at 890.
176. 2 U.S.C. 441a-1(a)(3) (2006).
177. Cass R. Sunstein, Political Equality and Unintended Consequences, 94 COLUM. L. REV.
1390, 1392 & n.11 (1994) (citing 14 JAMES MADISON, THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 197
(Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1983)).
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funding.178 However, a candidate that chooses public funding must abide
by a statutory cap,179 whereas a candidate who personally funds his own
campaign may make unlimited expenditures.180 Today, many states allow a
publicly funded candidate to receive additional ―matching‖ funds whenever
a self-financing candidate makes expenditures above a certain limit.181
However, under Davis, self-financing candidates claim that they must chill
their expenditures to avoid providing the benefit of ―matching funds‖ to the
non-wealthy candidate.182 Thus, even though candidates have equal
contribution limits in most states, matching-funds provisions are now
constitutionally unsecure and non-wealthy candidates lack an avenue to
effectively campaign against their wealthy opponents.183
Davis has already impacted public financing ―matching funds‖ laws in
several states. First, in McComish v. Brewer,184 candidates for public office
sought to enjoin the state‘s distribution of funds under Arizona‘s ―matching
funds‖ public financing law.185 The United States District Court for the
District of Arizona found that the statute most likely violated the First
Amendment in light of Davis‘s holding.186 The Court determined that the
statute penalized self-financing candidates for funding their own campaigns
whenever the state distributed additional funds to publicly funded

178. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2772 (majority opinion). Currently, only fifteen states provide direct
public financing to candidates; however, the financing schemes differ widely. Public Financing in
the States, http://www.commoncause.org/site/pp.asp?c=dkLNK1MQIwG&b=4773825 (last
visited May 18, 2009).
179. For example, in Maryland, candidates for governor who elect to publicly fund their
campaigns are limited to spending the product of twenty cents times the population of the state.
MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW § 15-104 note (2003).
180. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2772.
181. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A §§ 1121–1128 (2008); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.
55C, §§ 1–12 (2007); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 169.265 (2005).
182. E.g., McComish v. Brewer, No. cv-08-1550-PHX-ROS, 2008 WL 4629337, at *2–*3 (D.
Ariz. Oct. 17, 2008) (stating claims of various plaintiff-candidates alleging that Arizona‘s public
financing laws chill their speech).
183. See, e.g., Adam Bonin, Opinion, Average Joes Struggle To Be Heard as Campaign
System Favors the Rich, PHILA. INQUIRER, Aug. 7, 2008, at A15, available at
http://njcitizenaction.org/news/cfr167.html (―Because [asymmetrical public funding] reforms call
for government spending to boost the speech of some candidates and not others, however, the
Supreme Court decision now calls them into constitutional doubt.‖). But see Paul S. Ryan, Public
Financing After Davis: “The Reports of My Death Are Greatly Exaggerated,” CAMPAIGN LEGAL
CENTER BLOG, Jul. 23, 2008, http://www.clcblog.org/blog_item-239.html (arguing that Davis
should not lead courts to hold that public financing statutes are unconstitutional).
184. No. cv-08-1550-PHX-ROS, 2008 WL 4629337.
185. Id. at *1.
186. Id. at *6–*9 (stating that the plaintiffs had shown a high likelihood of success in
challenging Arizona‘s Citizens Clean Elections Act, which matched publicly funded candidates to
privately funded candidates).
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candidates.187 Second, primarily as a result of concerns over the effect of
Davis, the New Jersey legislature refused to reenact the successful 2007
New Jersey Fair and Clean Elections Pilot Project Act,188 which was
similar to the BCRA.189 Lastly, California‘s similar fund-matching statute,
the California Clean Money and Fair Elections Act,190 has been criticized
as likely violating the First Amendment after Davis.191 Thus, Davis calls
into question many viable and effective public financing schemes that
merely aid the non-wealthy candidate in making his voice heard.192
C. Had the Court Applied “Closely Drawn” Scrutiny to BCRA’s
Section 319(a), the Result Would Have Furthered the First
Amendment Interests of Both Candidates
By applying strict scrutiny to the BCRA‘s contribution limits, the
Court invalidated a law that increased the amount of free speech possible in

187. Id. at *1 (―Once a traditional candidate‘s contributions and expenditures exceed the baselevel grant given to participating candidates, her participating opponent or opponents will receive
almost dollar-for-dollar matching funds from the [Arizona fund].‖).
188. Assemb. B. 100, 212th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2007). The 2009 version of the law would
have established a maximum of $75,000 in public funding for party candidates in both the primary
and general elections. Assemb. B. 100, 213th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2008). The speaker of the
New Jersey Assembly, Joseph Roberts, decided to put the 2009 Clean Elections bill on hold so
that the courts and Congress could determine the constitutionality of ―matching funds‖ provisions.
See James Ahearn, Calling A Time Out On Clean Elections, NORTHJERSEY.COM, Sept. 10, 2008,
http://www.northjersey.com/opinion/moreviews/28123569.html (stating that the speaker put the
2009 Clean Elections bill on hold to ―leave the next steps to the courts and Congress‖).
189. See Letter from Albert Porroni, Legislative Counsel, New Jersey State Legislature, to
William Castner, Executive Director, Assembly Democratic Office (July 21, 2008) (on file with
author) (arguing that the New Jersey Clean Elections Pilot Project Act of 2009 would likely
violate the First Amendment in light of the Davis decision); Editorial, Campaign Finance Reform,
194 N.J.L.J. 490 (2008) (―The decision to suspend the program and to scrap A-100 was predicated
primarily on concerns over the effect that the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in [Davis v. FEC]
might have on the constitutionality of . . . ‗rescue money‘ provision[s].‖) (citation omitted); see
also Rick Esenberg, Davis v. FEC: The Day’s Most Important Decision, SHARK AND SHEPHERD,
June
26,
2008,
http://sharkandshepherd.blogspot.com/2008/06/davis-v-fec-days-mostimportant.html (―Davis may signal the death of public financing.‖).
190. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 91095 (West 2008). In 2006, California voters rejected Proposition
89, which was an earlier version of the Clean Elections Act, by almost 75%. Smartvoter.org,
Proposition 89, http://smartvoter.org/2006/11/07/ca/state/prop/89/ (last visited March 7, 2009).
For further details on Proposition 89, see http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/vig_06/general_06/pdf/
proposition_89/entire_prop89.pdf (last visited May 18, 2009).
191. Ballot Access News, California Senate Passes Public Funding Pilot Project Bill, Aug. 30,
2008,
http://www.ballot-access.org/2008/08/30/california-senate-passes-public-funding-pilotproject-bill/ (―The [law] is probably unconstitutional . . . under this year‘s U.S. Supreme Court
decision [Davis v. FEC].‖).
192. See, e.g., Laura MacCleery, Protecting the Rights of Millionaires, THE NATION, April 23,
2008, http://www.thenation.com/doc/20080505/maccleery (―In Maine, where 80 percent of
statehouse candidates use public funding, a single mother and former waitress ran for office and
won.‖).
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political campaigns.193 Instead, the Court should have upheld the BCRA‘s
contribution limits under the ―closely drawn‖ standard, as established by
Buckley and its progeny.194 Doing so would have improved political
fairness and efficiency in several ways.
First, Section 319(a) increases the amount of free speech in the
electoral process.
When a non-wealthy candidate receives higher
contributions, political campaigns will experience more free speech, thus
furthering the purpose of the First Amendment.195 With Section 319(a),
Congress merely enabled the non-wealthy candidate to promote his
platform so voters can make informed decisions on election day.196 As
Justice Stevens emphasized, if only the wealthy candidate can promote his
platform because he has the resources to do so, voters may make less
informed decisions.197
Second, Section 319(a) allows both wealthy and non-wealthy
candidates to spend more time meeting voters and discussing issues and less
time fundraising.198 The self-financing candidate does not suffer the
burden of fundraising, but instead puts pressure on his opponent to ―raise
and spend amounts that will match the high-spenders.‖199 The BCRA‘s
enhanced contribution limits alleviate that pressure because the candidate
may receive funds from fewer donors to match his opponent, thus saving
time.200 A reduction in fundraising time would benefit the political system
because candidates would spend more time speaking to the voters and
debating issues.201 In contrast, without support, a non-wealthy candidate
must struggle to fundraise from more sources in order to make his voice
heard, thus decreasing his ability to exercise his right to free speech in the
campaigning process.202
193. See Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2780 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (―Enhancing the
speech of the millionaire‘s opponent . . . advances [the First Amendment‘s] core principles.‖).
194. See supra Part IV.A.
195. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2780.
196. See id.
197. Id. (―If only one candidate can make himself heard, the voter‘s ability to make an
informed choice is impaired.‖). In contrast, without §319(a), a wealthy candidate can dominate
the media simply by outspending his non-wealthy opponent. Cf. supra note 170.
198. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2779; see also Richard Briffault, The Return of Spending Limits:
Campaign Finance After Landell v. Sorrell, 32 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 399, 429–32 (2005) (arguing
that the most disturbing consequences of our current campaign finance system are the distraction
of officeholders from their official duties, and ―the increasing tendency of the fundraising system
to discourage‖ non-wealthy candidates from campaigning).
199. Briffault, supra note 198, at 424–25.
200. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2779; see also Rosenstiel v. Rodriguez, 101 F.3d 1544, 1553 (8th Cir.
1996) (stating that reducing the time candidates spend fundraising, ―thereby increasing the time
available for discussions of the issues,‖ is a compelling state interest).
201. See Furst, supra note 175, at 890.
202. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2779.
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Lastly, Section 319(a) promotes the notion that congressional seats are
not for sale.203 The perception that public office can be purchased reduces
voter confidence,204 which increases the risk that voters may drop out of the
electoral process.205 However, effective and healthy democracy depends
on the participation of the electorate.206 Thus, by providing an avenue for a
non-wealthy candidate to promote his platform equally against a wealthy,
self-financing opponent, voter confidence in the electoral process will
increase.
V. CONCLUSION
In Davis v. FEC, the Supreme Court of the United States held that
Section 319(a) of the BCRA violated the First Amendment because it
impermissibly chilled a self-financing candidate‘s speech.207 In so holding,
the Court incorrectly struck down Section 319(a) by applying strict
scrutiny, rather than ―closely drawn‖ scrutiny.208 Failing to apply the
appropriate standard to Section 319(a), the Court closed off viable avenues
for non-wealthy candidates to compete against wealthy candidates for
congressional seats.209 Had the Court properly applied ―closely drawn‖
scrutiny, it would likely have upheld the BCRA‘s contribution limits, which
would have legitimized campaign finance reform by allowing non-wealthy
candidates to compete equally with wealthy candidates for a seat in the
House.210

203. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2779–80. See also 148 CONG. REC. S2142 (2002) (statement of Sen.
McCain) (―Congress has concluded that the contribution limits—despite their fundamental
importance in fighting actual and apparent corruption—should be relaxed to mitigate the
countervailing risk that they will unfairly favor those who are willing, and able, to spend a small
fortune of their own money to win election.‖).
204. A majority of Americans are bothered by the high levels of campaign spending, and ―half
are dissatisfied with the nation‘s campaign finance laws.‖ Furst, supra note 175, at 875–76. See
also COMM‘N ON FED. ELECTION REFORM, BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN U.S. ELECTIONS: REPORT
OF THE COMMISSION ON FEDERAL ELECTION REFORM ii (2005), available at
http://www.american.edu/ia/cfer/report/full_report.pdf (stating that Americans are losing faith in
the electoral process).
205. Furst, supra note 175, at 876.
206. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov‘t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 390 (2000) (―Democracy works ‗only if
the people have faith in those who govern, and that faith is bound to be shattered when high
officials and their appointees engage in activities which arouse suspicions of malfeasance and
corruption.‘‖ (quoting United States v. Miss. Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520, 562 (1961)));
Homans v. City of Albuquerque, 160 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1269 (2001) (finding that voter turnout
significantly dropped when Albuquerque temporarily suspended its mandatory spending limits,
indicating low voter confidence in the electoral process).
207. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2771 (majority opinion).
208. See supra Part IV.A.
209. See supra Part IV.B.
210. See supra Part IV.C.

